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-TEMENT OF F 4CTS 
•
 !
 As to dates and times and ux/ations, Respondent accepts the facts as stated hv 
Appellant in lis burl I IICR* ;in' hownrr several fioiiih of claritVdlJuii ihal ri * be 
made in order for this Court to take cognizance of the issues now before it* Before 
commencing a discussion, of 'those matters, Respondent 'wishes to state that the whole of 
Appellant's ca se rests upon the interpretation of the licensing statutes (U.C.A §58-22 et 
seq.) and that if Appellant either falls outside of the class whose protection was 
contemplated by the Leg) ^ \M \ . • l >- • • • i . . \ 
Appellant's case must fail. Appellant does not appeal from, the jury's verdict and. award of 
damages to Respondent, 
The "specific" contents of spedl" sed in making the machine in question 
were primarily under the control of App* s. i • * .v hich were changed several tmies h\ ihem 
unilaterally appellant's engineer* determine*) that the coils manufactui • <-
cleaner»« • ->K ends anu daaca that requirement to the specifications >T -w .; -
Specifications were changed to conform to a limited gauge of wire, not the broad spa'inim 
of gauges first liste* » * • * ing dev ice tm 11n • 
washers Wei*, an uUunum by Appellant's engineers to the specifications. (T 85, . x i. 
269-270) 1 fj"re were severil discuwnns with AprHkr* follow * *>% l rvje.s K *h 
specificati' ^ <^ ( . »e process ..„. •: J.V* ue v. ums>g the 
hook off of the pigtails, (T, 232, 234-235) In short, the "specific" specification* Appellant 
refers to weren't ii stiitic body of instructions. ;i "d **•*". * •- . h.n „./•.-•• °e 
peniHJ in question, by the decisions of Appellant ^ engineers, &> well as at the outset \ i 
85,86) 
Appdimn fiJis ;i staff nt rompeteni nigiiieers., suinc oi vuiom itu", m licensee^ WHO 
actively worked on the project (T. 56) Mr, Blackett pulled an engineer from An; Hian* -
staff "into getting used to the machine and working with Dick on the inmli» • • 48) 
Jv Ii Coy met frequentl) with I"\ 1 n: Ii ey to rev iew design (T 138) Mr Ashburn spent 
significant time working on the design with Mr. Irey. (T. 425) Mr. Irey visited and 
consulted with them often (T. 93) The Quality Control of the coils produced was under the 
exclusive control of Appellant. (T. 94) 
Appellant paints Respondent as a person who willfully flaunted the provisions of 
the licensing statutes. To the contrary, Mr. Irey believed that he was complying with the 
statute by using engineers on project. He employed Mr. Linsey, a licensed professional 
engineer to "advise, direct and carry out" projects. (T. 428) Mr. Linsey considered himself 
as being responsible for the engineering quality of the machine. (T. 433) Mr. Linsey was 
compensated for his time (T. 431) (Mr. Linsey was brought into the project and paid for 
his time - see Mr. Linsey's Transcript at 18) Mr. Linsey was involved with this project at 
virtually every step and ran several tests and analyses on the machine to assure that it was 
sound. The depth of his involvement is revealed in his testimony (Mr. Linsey's transcript 
pp. 8-13) The following excerpt from Mr. Linsey's testimony proves insightful as to his 
overall role in the project: 
Q (By Mr. Fankhauser) do you consider yourself to be the 
engineer in supervision of this project along with Mr. Irey? 
A Overall, making sure that the machine complies with good 
engineering practice and manufacturing, yes. 
Mr. Linsey consulted regularly with Mr. Irey's company on various projects. (T. 227-
228) Mr. Linsey handled the design of the frame. (T. 247) He was involved in the project 
from the very beginning (T. 249) Mr Irey used Mr. Griffen on the project as a licensed 
professional engineer. He also employed Mr. Kirk, an engineer. (T. 423-424) Mr. Irey 
called upon other engineers as needed. (T. 429) 
There was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that the machine did in fact work 
at a higher rate than 400 pieces per hour rate. (Appellant it seems made every effort to 
prevent Mr. Irey from testing the machine under actual operating conditions in that 
Appellant failed to supply Mr. Irey with the hundreds of parts necessary to complete and 
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Appellant **>!!* nu^ .1, ut involved w uh the project in depth as a consultant for Appellant, 
believed that the machine was functional at a rate of at least 400 pieces per hour,; and,, 
otherwise could save money if only used to pull the pigtails J15, 208) Hie machine 
could not run at the rate of 600 pieces per hour as it was slowed down due to Appellant's 
constant and di amatic improvement in the performance of the unn (T 207-208) The 
machine had successfully produced thousands of parts, by the resourcefulness of Mr Irey, 
reuse. (T. 38 3] 
The machine produced bv Mr Trey's company was not intended for public use, nor 
<. nr the coiled pam it produced - \
 t\ unit's witness stated ,f,ve >ell to companies *b"' 
• > ' * r . v - r >-. , U ' ,:• " J ' - f e • u - t '" 'A Mi.1v ' U H C H J" M 
bmerson, the parent company who used m The machine itself was to be used exclusively 
Appellant claimed, and was awarded ownership of the machine * "I 122) 
Appellant derived significant benefit from, it by using it for depreciation, against taxes on 
Hit'oiiM" I! 1 I I I'll Appellwil stuijtijil iiml iihluiiinl .i rouM older unci exclusive control ot it. 
( I 114-115) Appellant received a machine, which, the jury could properly conclude, 
functioned, as per the specifications as modified by Appellant's requested changes. 
< 'ontrary to will a I Appellant would ha ve this Coui 1: believe, Mi Irey is considered 
experienced and innovative by those engineers who worked with him. (Mr, Linsey's 
experience. ( I 225-226), and had,,, success*u- ,%;ed projects as,, 01 more 
than this one. (T. 229) Although not licensed to practice engineering for the general, lay 
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public, his competence when associated with licensed engineers and working on projects 
for companies staffed heavily with engineers is well founded. 
Finally, the statements of the court concerning the reasons for denying Appellant's 
motions below based upon U.C.A. §58-22 are of interest: 
The Court: The court denies the motion. The Court does so 
for the following reasons: first of all, the Court believes that 
the matter's already been ruled on by another judge, and 
therefore, is the law of the case. But in addition thereto, the 
Court rules that the motion should be denied, first of all, the 
corporation -- the undisputed evidence which I have before 
me is that the corporation did have available to it the services 
of licensed engineers who were concerned with the 
construction and were counseled on the matter. In addition 
to this, I believe the earlier judge has ruled that this is not 
necessarily one of those situations where you are involved in 
the protection of the general public, but is - this is a 
situation where you're involved in the technical dealings of 
corporations, both of which have the services of trained 
engineers. (Reporter's transcript on the ruling of the motion, 
pp. 18-19, emphasis added) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1- IS APPELLANT A MEMBER OF THE CLASS WHICH WAS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. §58-22?; 
2- IS RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A CLASS EXEMPTED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF 
U.C.A. §58-22? 
3- DID THE EXCLUSION OF A BREACH OF WARRANTY INSTRUCTION RESULT IN 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR FROM WHICH APPELLANT MAY RIGHTFULLY CLAIM RELIEF? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no statutes determinative of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement of the case as sufficiently accurate for a 
determination of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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Utah Code Annotated Chapter 50 Section 22, et seq., was intended to protect the 
lay public from fraud and incompetence practiced by unlicensed engineers and was an 
appropriate exercise of police powers by the Legislature of the State of Utah. Appellant 
Corporation does not fit the classification of lay public supplied by this Court in previous 
decisions and cannot therefore hide from its legitimate obligations to Respondent by raising 
the specter of statutory violation. Appellant employed several engineers during the course 
of events that led to the trial below. Several of Appellant's dngineers were involved in the 
manufacture of the machine in question in that they 1- exercised control of what constituted 
the specifications which the machine was to meet; 2- supervised and assisted in the work 
performed by Irey while the machine was located at their plant; If Mr. Irey were practicing 
fraud upon Appellant or were he incompetent, Appellant was in a position to have made 
that judgment at any point and was not in need of the protection which U.C.A. §58-22 
affords the lay public. The involvement of Appellant's qualified engineers to such a degree 
makes clear the fact that Appellant, strictly an industrial heating manufacturer, is not a 
member of the lay public. 
Even if, arguendo, Appellant were a member of the class which the statute seeks to 
protect, Respondent was a member of that class exempted from its provisions. Respondent 
hired licensed engineers to work with him on the manufacture of the machine. Mr. Linsey, 
in particular, was hired for the purpose of approving the design of the machine and the 
implementation of that design. Both Mr. Linsey and Respondent were of the opinion that 
he was to supervise the actual design of the machine to assure that it complied with 
standard engineering practices. Furthermore, Respondent, ih good faith, believed that by 
hiring licensed engineers to work on and supervise the project he was complying with the 
provisions of the statute in question. Since the project was under the supervision of a 
licensed engineer and since Respondent acted in good faith, he is exempted from its 
provisions. 
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Lastly, Point II of Appellant's brief is curious. In the first paragraph of this point it 
states that it listed a cause of action against Respondent for Breach of Warranty, and in the 
second and concluding paragraph notes that the court below failed to allow and instruction 
for the same. Nowhere does Appellant give proof of the fact that it had presented sufficient 
proof to support the giving of the instruction, nor does Appellant demonstrate that it was 
prejudiced by the failure to give the instruction. That Appellant plead a breach of warranty 
is not sufficient enough to warrant its inclusion as a jury instruction. Furthermore, unless 
Appellant proves prejudice, the failure to give the instruction is not reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CLASS PROTECTED BY UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED §58-22 ET SEQ. 
Appellant incorrectly states that "the strength of statutes such as thesc.has been 
somewhat eroded in recent years/1 Correcdy stated, the strength of U.C.A. §58-22 has 
been improved in recent years since this Court, and others around the nation, have placed 
the coverage of the same in a proper context. This statute is, insofar as it is designed to 
protect the lay public and legitimate innocents, a proper exercise of the police power of the 
state. By enforcing its provisions only where the lay public and legitimate innocents are 
involved, the Court has set the penumbra of the same to include those persons which need 
protection and to exclude those persons and corporations which have no need of protection 
due to their special skills, knowledge and education. Appellant falls into the latter class of 
persons. Appellant is an industrial heating manufacturer that sells products to other 
industrial and commercial users (T. 6-7. 77) 
In Fillmore Products. Inc., v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P. 2d 687 (Utah 
1977) this Court concluded that "the purpose of licensing is to protect the public . . . there 
is no doubt that the purpose of the licensing statute relating to contractors is protection of 
the public." (Fillmore at 689) Appellant importantly supports the position that the same 
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provisions applied to contractors apply to engineers, and th^t U.C.A. 58 §22 was enacted 
in order to protect the public. (Appellant's brief at 33-34) Appellant, however, declines to 
define the term public, which burden has therefore fallen to Respondent through neglect. 
An important case that establishes the public, non-public distinction is cited by 
Appellant: Fillmore Products. Inc.. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P. 2d 687 (Utah 
1977). In Fillmore, a subcontractor entered into a contract with a licensed general 
contractor, the whole project being under the supervision of a licensed engineer. The Court 
concluded that "the licensed contractor cannot invoke the application of the general rule of 
denying relief to an unlicensed contractor solely because of tpe latter's non-licensing when 
a contract for construction is struck between them." (Fillmore at 690) In Lignell v. Berg. 
593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979), the Court reaffirmed the Fillmor^ ruling, stating: "In 
rFillmorel we adopted the point of view expressed by Professor Corbin, viz., "the general 
rule" (of unenforceability) is not to be applied mechanically but in a manner "permitting the 
court to consider the merits of the particular case and to avoia unreasonable penalties and 
forfeitures." (Lignell at 805) In that same case the Court made it abundandy clear (at 805) 
that the statute was designed to protect the public. The Fillmore case clarifies somewhat the 
term "public". It doesn't include those who are privy to the knowledge and skills required 
by the license. A general contractor cannot therefore bar recovery from a subcontractor 
exclusively by reliance on the latter's unlicensed status, because the special knowledge and 
skills of the general contractor remove the same from that category known as the "public." 
In the same manner, a corporation loaded with trained and highly skilled engineers cannot 
bar recovery by one who, although staffed with licensed engineers for that project, was 
unlicensed. Appellant, is not a member of the protected class, because of its staff of 
qualified engineers which makes it privy to the skills and special knowledge lacking in the 
general public. 
A more recent case reinforces the public, non-public distinction even further. In 
Loader v. Scott Construction Corp.. 681 P. 2d 1227 (Utah 1^84), the Court, emphasizing 
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the expertise of the Defendant (in this case the Plaintiff was unlicensed), modified the terms 
public and general public, by using a new and more precise term, the lay public. As 
persons trained in the intricacies of legal and judicial practices, our profession separates 
itself from the lay public in the area of law, much the same as one trained in construction is 
different in skills and knowledge from the lay public in the area of construction and an 
engineer is different from those not versed in engineering, the lay engineering public. 
Loader makes clear that the lay public is the class protected by licensing statutes. One 
should expect that a trained lawyer who worked with a person practicing fraud or an 
incompetent would recognize the latter as a fraud or an incompetent during the course of a 
close relationship. A lawyer needs no protection from such a person, whereas a lone 
individual, ignorant of legal practice could easily fall victim to such a one. By analogy, if 
Mr. Irey were a fraud or incompetent, something not even raised at trial, one could expect 
trained engineers to recognize him as such, yet Mr. Linsey refers to him as a miracle 
worker. It is hard to believe that Appellant is in a position to be defrauded by an 
incompetent. In the following passage taken from Loader, the Court can easily substitute 
the words "licensed contractor" for "qualified engineer", and "Appellant" for "Scott": 
"As a licensed contractor, Scott is presumed to possess 
expertise in the contracting [engineering] business. Scott, 
therefore, is not in need of the protection the licensing statute 
was intended to provide the lg£ public. No public policy 
would be served by allowing Scott to invoke application of 
the [rule] denying relief to an unlicensed contractor. (Loader 
at 1229) 
Appellant looks to this court to mechanically apply the statute so as to preclude 
Respondent from its rightful compensation, when no public policy would be served 
thereby and Appellant is in no need of protection. The key to administering justice in the 
instant case lies in understanding just what public means, and that Appellant is not a 
member of the lay public and needs no protection via the statute. Since Appellant is not a 
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member of the protected class, it cannot successfully maintain its Appeal as to Points I and 
III. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH BELIEVING THAT HE WAS COMPLYING WITH U.C.A. 
§58-22 BY HIRING LICENSED ENGINEERS TO WORK ON THE PROJECT. 
Mr. Lrey's testimony reveals that he believed that the hiring of licensed engineers to 
supervise and participate actively in key aspects of the development of the coiling machine 
satisfied the requirements of the licensing statute. Loader states, with regard to good faith 
compliance, which is mistaken: 
Loader testified that he operated in good faith under the 
mistaken belief that his former partner's license applied to 
him. Unlike the willful disregard of the licensing statute that 
we disapproved of in fGeorge v. Oren Limited Associates. 
672 P. 2d 732 (Utah 1983)] at 736-737, we find the 
circumstance to be similar to the inadvertent lapse of a 
license we identified as a mitigating factor in ^ ignell at 805. 
A good faith mistake alone will not insulate a contractor from 
application of the general rule denying relief. It is, however, 
one factor that we may consider in determining the rule's 
application. (Loader at 1229-1230) 
While Respondent does not argue that this relives itself from ihe responsibility to comply 
with the licensing statutes, it establishes a good faith compliance, in contrast to the 
inaccurate picture of Mr. Irey painted by Appellant. Taken together with the other factors 
involved in this case, to wit., the fact that Appellant is not within the protected class, and 
the fact that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that the 
machine was operative, it is clear that Appellant's case is withdut merit. (Appellant argues 
that the machine never was operated for more than 10 - 20 minutes, but this was due to the 
Appellant's lack of cooperation in supplying parts for testing the machine over a period of 
an hour or more.) It would be patently unfair to give Appellant its requested relief,would 
further no important public policy, and would wrongfully punish Respondent. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that Appellant was a member of a protected class viz-a-viz the 
statute in question, then the fact that there is evidence upon which the jury could conclude 
that the machine worked as well as Respondent's good faith compliance with the statute 
mitigates Appellant's arguments. Their appeal should not be allowed to stand. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE FAILURE TO GIVE AN 
INSTRUCTION ON BREACH OF WARRANTY RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR, AND HAS 
FAILED TO SO PROVE 
Respondent would invite this Court to review Point II of Appellant's brief. There 
is no mention of the words "prejudicial error" nor any indication that the failure to give the 
instruction as requested was supported by evidence and therefore proper. There is no 
mention of an abuse of discretion by the Judge below, which must be shown. In E.A. 
Strout v. Fov & Sons, 665 P. 2d 1320 (Utah 1983) the Supreme Court held that the view 
of the trial court regarding the giving of instructions would not be disturbed absent a 
showing of abuse of discretion. There has been no showing of abuse in Appellant's brief. 
Furthermore, Appellant has failed to bear an important evidentiary burden. A court 
may properly refuse to give a jury instruction where the law governing the case does not 
accurately reflect the facts presented at trial (Black v. McK^ight 562 P. 2d 621 (Utah 
1977). The duty of the trial court to give competent instruction holds only where 
competent evidence has been presented to support its being given.(Black at 622: see also 
Power's v. Gene's Bldg. Materials. Inc., 567 P. 2d 174 (Utah 1977)) Appellant presents 
no argument in its brief supporting a conclusion that the failure to give the instruction was 
in error, the instruction having been supported by competent evidence. In fact, the 
instruction wasn't given because there was no supportive evidence below. Point II of 
Appellant's brief is therefore without merit and undeserving of the time and attention of this 
Court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant is not a member of the lay public with regard to the practice of 
engineering. Points I & DI of their appeal must fail. Furthermore, a good faith compliance 
with the licensing statute was made, the project was supervised by a licensed engineer 
assisted by other licensed engineers, and the claim that machine would function as per the 
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specifications was supported by the evidence. They have never alleged fraud or 
incompetence, or otherwise placed themselves squarely within a protected class. Lasdy, 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the giving of a breach of warranty instruction was a 
prejudicial error. The entire appeal is therefore without merit and should be denied and 
Respondent awarded its cost, and other relief that justice requires. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1988. 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser 
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